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Moral behaviour has long been associated with well-being, but the nature of this 
relationship is not fully understood. The reconciliation model of moral centrality 
offers a unique framework to understand this relationship. According to the recon-
ciliation model, the opposing force between self-interest and morality can be trans-
formed to one of synergy by developing moral centrality. In turn, this confluence if
self-interest and morality should lead to higher psychological well-being. The aim 
of this study was designed to examine the association between moral centrality and
standard markers of mental health and well-being while statistically controlling for
any protective effects of altruistic behaviour. Participants were 119 undergraduate 
university students who completed an online questionnaires assessing standard 
markers of mental health and well-being, and open-ended questions about their 
cherished goals. Moral centrality was operationalized as the tendency to coordinate
agentic (self-interested) and communal (concern for others) values in these self-
narratives. Moral centrality was positively associated with well-being and self-es-
teem, and negatively associated with negative affect, depression, and anxiety. Al-
truism did not explain this association and instead was associated only with posi-
tive affect. An exploratory analysis revealed that the specific coordination of the 
agentic value achievement and the communal value benevolence may be responsi-
ble for this association. Together, these results suggest that the coordination of 
agentic and communal motivations may play a meaningful role in the maintenance 
of mental health and psychological well-being.
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The interweaving of morality and mental health has been a pervasive theme 
throughout history. First explicitly articulated in Plato's Republic as moral health, the 
idea that morality is in some way related to human well-being and happiness is a core 
assumption in many world religions and philosophies like Buddhism, Stoicism, Yoga, 
and Aristotelianism, and continues to be a compelling proposition in modern society. 
Indeed, many best-selling self-help books promote the mental health benefits of character
development, such as such as Peterson's 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos (2018) 
and Covey's (1989) The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People. 
Evidence for this connection is growing with research showing that, for instance, 
prosocial and altruistic behaviour is associated with greater happiness (Borgonovi, 2008; 
Phelps, 2001; Post, 2005) and overall mental health (Schwartz et al., 2003). Similarly, 
programs like the 12-Step Program have demonstrated success with using moral 
treatment and ethical discipline as tools to combat mental illness and addiction, and there 
are now many professionals arguing for the utility of employing ethics and character 
development in psychotherapy (see Andrews, 1989; Martin, 2006; Waring, 2012). The 
success of these interventions suggests that there is great potential for developing novel 
treatments that integrate moral values. 
Yet despite the evidence for the association between morality and well-being, the 
nature of this relationship remains elusive. According to one account, morality is 
psychologically beneficial because it incurs social rewards (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; 
Stavrova et al., 2013). Although this view was supported in some studies, other studies 
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indicate that something about holding moral values can be inherently beneficial, 
regardless of whether they are socially rewarded (see Helliwell, 2003; James, 2011; 
Aknin et al., 2013). Here, Frimer and Walker’s (2009) reconciliation model of moral 
centrality will be explored as a framework for understanding the relationship between 
morality and mental health. Moral centrality refers to moral behaviour being seen as 
compatible with one’s own best interests and is a prominent characteristic of people who 
are publicly recognized to be moral exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992). According to the
reconciliation model, moral centrality is achieved when people reconcile their normally 
competing drives for agency (self-interest) and communion (morality) such that the 
satisfaction of one implies satisfaction of the other. That is, people identify moral action 
as being in their own interest so that the distinction between morality and self-interest 
becomes a false dichotomy. 
In this paper, I propose that the reconciliation model of moral centrality can help 
to explain why morality might be associated with mental health and well-being. In short, 
the reconciliation model posits that the drives for agency and communion are developed 
as two distinct motivational systems that are normally in tension. This tension becomes a 
source of internal disequilibrium, which can result in an overt focus on satisfying one 
drive at the cost of the other. Conversely, because the development of moral centrality 
represents a synergistic integration of these needs, whereby the satisfaction of 
communion implies the satisfaction of agency, it may allow for a more balanced drive 
satisfaction and thus serve to promote mental health and psychological well-being.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the reconciliation of agentic and 
communal goals is associated with psychological well-being. Although altruism and 
2
prosocial behaviour may contribute to mental health, the goal of this study is to examine 
whether the integration of agency and communion may promote well-being or serve as an
additional buffer against psychological distress, above and beyond altruism and prosocial 
behaviour. Thus, the primary hypothesis of this work is that the integration of agentic and
communal motivations will be associated with markers of mental health, even after 
accounting for the possible benefits of altruistic behaviour. If this hypothesis is verified, 
this research will provide further clarification of the complex relationship between 
morality and psychological well being. 
Morality
Although morality is often conflated with altruism, the two concepts are distinct. 
Morality can be defined descriptively as “certain codes of conduct put forward by a 
society or group, such as a religion, or accepted by an individual for her own behavior” 
(Gert & Gert, 2017). In contrast, altruism refers to concern for, and behaviour that is 
aimed at, the welfare of others. Although morality often results in altruistic behaviour, 
morality also encompasses an idea of right and wrong that altruism does not. That is, 
moral principles are rules of behaviour that are intended to be followed regardless of 
whether or not they contribute to the good of another person. For instance, subscribing to 
the moral principle of honesty may prohibit someone from lying, even if it would benefit 
someone else. 
Moral motivation is often conceptualized in two ways. First, morality can be 
thought of as a duty that is either unrelated or even opposed to human impulses and self-
interest. This way of thinking will be referred to as the duty-based paradigm of morality. 
According to this view, morality is a set of rules or imperatives that must be followed 
because they are the right thing to do. Acting morally therefore is not associated with 
3
well-being and can induce people to behave in ways that interfere or are against their own
self-interests. In support of this view, Bakan (1966) argues that unmitigated agency is the 
root of all evils and thus the goal of moral development must be to quell agency in favour
of communal motivation. 
One of the most well-known examples of this form of duty-based moral system is 
the moral philosophy of Kant. Central to his philosophy is a rational call to morality 
known as the categorical imperative: “act only according to that maxim whereby you can,
at the same time, will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 2002, p.37). This 
appeals to morality strictly on rational grounds. For Kant, people engage in moral activity
out of a sense of duty because it is rational, not because it makes them happy. For people 
who hold this view, the main task of character education is to teach people to be 
“governed by duty” (Baron, 1985; p. 146). Thus, the rules of morality from this 
perspective are conceived of as a guide to being a good person, but not as a guide for 
well-being. 
A second view is that acting morally is in the best interest of the actor. This 
paradigm will subsequently be referred to as the enlightened self-interest perspective. 
According to this view morality is often, if not always, somehow motivated by self-
interest. A person is said to have developed enlightened self-interest when they identify 
the interests of others as being their own best interest. To grasp this concept, it can be 
useful to think of enlightened self-interest from the perspective of playing a team sport. 
When playing a team sport, the best interest of the player and the best interest of the team
are the same. A selfish player that does not pass or play fairly will cause their teammates 
to dislike them and ultimately make the team more likely to lose. In this situation, it is in 
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the player's best interest to be a good team player, because that ultimately increases his 
chances of winning the game and of being liked by his teammates. The player 
experiences enlightened self-interest insofar as she has internalized this truth and plays by
these rules, doing what is best for the team. In contrast, the player demonstrates 
unenlightened self-interest when she plays selfishly and ignores her teammates. 
Enlightened self-interest suggests that living a moral life is healthy, which is an 
explicit assumption in many philosophical, religious, and spiritual practices. To illustrate 
this, I will briefly examine two traditions that are a part of the separate fields of religion 
and philosophy because they both can be clearly related to the reconciliation model of 
moral centrality. 
One example from philosophy was developed by Aristotle. In his Nichomachean 
Ethics (2000), Aristotle writes about eudaimonia, which is a definition of human well-
being that is characterized by living up to one’s true potential as a human being. 
According to Aristotle, the ultimate aim of moral thought and behaviour is to achieve this
state of eudaimonic well-being. This requires one to develop behavioural inclinations to 
act in a way that contributes to personal flourishing. That is, to shape the appetites so that
they are expressed in a healthy and beneficial way. For example, food is related to 
pleasure, energy, and health, but the natural appetites for food are not always harmonious
with what is healthy. Developing virtue in this regard would be to actively shape the 
appetite and develop habits so that healthy options are preferred. Similarly, creating a 
habit of channelling stress towards exercising would be considered virtuous, while a 
smoking habit would be considered a vice. In both cases, people shape their basic 
physical appetites in such a way that their satisfaction will lead to long term benefits. 
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This concept of channelling the physical appetites can be extended to behavioural 
expectations in personal relationships and society at large. Abiding by behavioural 
expectations may prevent the satisfaction of a basic desire. For instance, a child being 
asked to get along with others and follow the rules of a game may experience a threat to 
their personal agency. However, they may come to see abiding by the rules and playing 
fair as a method by which they can make new friends and get invited to play future 
games. Thus, playing by the rules stops being perceived as a threat to personal agency. 
Rather, it becomes satisfied in a way that corresponds with behavioural expectations and 
which leads to positive future benefits. 
Another example of a moral system that holds an enlightened self-interest 
perspective is the philosophy of Ashtanga Yoga, which was formulated in Patanjali's 
Yoga Sutras. This ancient philosophy is based on eight principles, often referred to as the 
eight limbs of yoga that, when adhered to, lead to a calm mind and a reduction in distress 
(Maehle, 2006). Of primary importance here is the inclusion of 10 ethical rules: five rules
of conduct towards others called yamas, which include principles like non-violence 
(ahimNsā), and five rules of conduct towards the self called niyamas, which include 
principles such as self-discipline (tapas). These ethical principles are practised because 
they promote harmonious relationships, a pure mind, and ultimately lead to a calm mind 
(Maehle, 2006). 
To briefly summarize, in both Yogic and Aristotelian ethics, living morally is 
ultimately a means to an end related to mental health and living well. In Yoga, that end is 
a calm mind, and for Aristotle, that end is eudaimonia. These examples are significant 
because they are ancient expressions of the proposition that morality is a key component 
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of mental health: Both systems explicitly prescribe moral imperatives as a means towards
well-being, optimal mental functioning, and a more balanced life. 
Evidence of Enlightened Self-Interest
Evidence in support of the contribution of enlightened self-interest to mental 
health has grown steadily over the past decades, and there is now evidence to support that
moral interventions promoting enlightened self-interest can contribute to mental health. A
well-known example of this integration is Alcoholics Anonymous’ 12-step program. 
Among 11 other steps, one requires its adherents to make a list of people they have 
harmed and attempt to make amends to them. This 12-step approach has become a 
popular treatment option that has been expanded to treat a large number of problem 
behaviours such as gambling and drug addiction. Indeed, up to 9% of the US adult 
population have attended at least one Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, and that number 
grows to over 13% of the adult population when non-alcohol oriented groups, such as 
Gamblers Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, are included (Room & Greenfield, 
1993). Studies have shown 12-step programs to be equally effective as dialectical 
behaviour therapy (Giannelli et al., 2019) and cognitive behavioural models of substance 
abuse treatment (Ouimette et al., 1997), and there is evidence that the moral components 
of the treatment contribute to its success. For instance, a qualitative study found that 
taking personal responsibility for past mistakes was considered by participants to be a 
key ingredient of recovery (DeLucia et al., 2015). 
Yoga is another example of a practice with a moral component that may improve 
mental health. Although westernised forms of yoga consist exclusively of physical 
activity, the practice of yoga was originally conceived as a holistic lifestyle that combines
7
spiritual, physical, and ethical practices. Specifically, the practice of yoga encompasses 
eight components that are intended to work synergistically: ethical behaviour, self-
purification, physical postures, breathing practice, discipline of the senses, concentration, 
meditation, and self-realization (Maehle, 2006). An integrated yoga practice combines 
these principles within the physical practice so that they become a truly lived experience 
that integrates mind and body. According to this tradition, these components 
synchronistically work to calm the mind and increase well-being. In congruence with 
these claims, the practice of yoga has been shown to be associated with many mental 
health benefits, and it is quickly gaining popularity as a clinical intervention for a wide 
array of mental illnesses. Indeed, yoga has been shown to improve anxiety and 
depression symptoms, affect, self-esteem, and interpersonal functioning (Jarry et al., 
2017), and a meta-analysis found evidence for the superiority of yoga over relaxation and
aerobic exercise in improving depression (Cramer et al., 2013). 
The success of interventions with a moral component provides ample reason for 
further exploration of the role of morality in psychological well-being. However, there 
has been little academic research conducted on how, or even whether, the morality 
component of these interventions contributes to their positive impact on mental health. 
Because treatments involving morality are inevitably combined with other treatment 
components, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the moral components of the treatment. 
For instance, comprehensive 12-step programs often are compared to different forms of 
psychotherapy (see Linehan et al., 2002; Ouimette et al., 1997), but there are many non-
moral aspects such as social support and fellowship of the 12-step program that may be 
contributing to its success as a treatment. Similarly, although yoga has a strong ethical 
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component, it is unknown whether this ethical component plays a role in the mental 
health benefits of yoga-based interventions. For example, the yoga intervention used in  
Jarry, Chang and LaCivita's (2017) study includes both ethical talks and physical poses, 
but the question remains whether the talks, the physical poses, or both are responsible for 
the intervention’s positive outcomes.
To date, there has only been one study comparing a holistic yoga intervention 
with a purely exercise based practice (Smith et al., 2011). In this study, participants were 
assigned to either a yoga-as-exercise, integrated yoga, or a control group whose 
participants completed questionnaires but did not participate in any type of intervention. 
In both yoga conditions, participants completed biweekly yoga sessions for 7 weeks. The 
integrated yoga group’s exercises were accompanied by meditation based on the ethical 
principles of yoga, while the yoga-as-exercise group omitted this aspect. Although 
participants in both yoga groups experienced a decrease in depression and stress and an 
increase in hopefulness, only the group that practiced the integrated yoga experienced a 
decrease in anxiety-related symptoms and in salivary cortisol. These results suggest 
unique benefits of the ethical aspects of yoga-based interventions, but more research is 
needed to fully explore their impact. 
In addition to these alternative therapies, there has been a general movement from
mental health professionals to include aspects of morality into their practice. In his book, 
To Thine Own Self Be True, Lewis Andrews (1989) documents the rise of mental health 
care workers who are “promoting ethical discipline as an explicit form of psychotherapy” 
(p. 8). He observes that, although academics continue to describe and conceive of mental 
health issues as medical diseases that are completely outside the control of those who 
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suffer from them, many mental health care workers are now explicitly promoting ethical 
discipline. Andrews argues that, even though training in psychotherapy focuses on 
remaining objective and value-free, most mental health care professionals rely heavily on
ethics. He points to a survey showing that over 95% of professionals agree with the idea 
that “assuming responsibility for one's actions” and “increasing one's capacity for self-
control” are essential requirements for mental health (Andrews, 1989, p. 8). 
There have also been numerous calls for mental health professionals to explore 
the relationship between morality and mental health, and to integrate character 
development into the therapeutic process. Waring (2012) has argued that psychotherapy 
not only should aim to alleviate mental disorders, but also to cultivate good character in 
patients. This sentiment is similarly echoed by Martin (2006; 2012), who has referred to 
this as an integrated moral-therapeutic perspective, and Andrews (1989) who refers to 
ethical therapy. Andrews even documents his own experience of ethical therapy, 
describing it as a personal revelatory inspiration for his book. As Andrews tried to make 
the case for telling a white lie, his psychologist conveyed that trying to manipulate 
somebody else by lying might hurt him, not in some kind of afterlife justice, but in the 
here and now. He specifies that “lying, if I took the trouble to be aware of it, was really a 
terrible psychological state. My vision dimmed, my pulse quickened anxiously, and there 
was a noticeable loss of contact with the outside world, all this in addition to any long-
term physical effects of stress” (p. 4). After this realisation, he made a concerted effort to 
consistently tell the truth and his life significantly improved. 
The various advocates of this so-called moral therapy all have different 
perspectives on the benefits of morality and how it might be integrated in a 
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psychotherapeutic setting, but all seem to agree that morality can address certain 
difficulties that traditional psychotherapy cannot address as effectively. That is, they 
agree that there seems to be something about morality itself that is protective/curative. 
However, without a systematic research program, it is not possible to isolate and identify 
the salubrious effects of moral development and the mechanisms by which morality 
increases well-being, or to develop interventions that take advantage of this knowledge. 
Explaining the Benefits of Morality
In harmony with these ancient systems of morality based on enlightened self-
interest, modern research in psychology provides ample evidence to suggest that there is 
an association between behaviours that would normally be considered ‘moral’ and well-
being. Indeed, there is now an abundant literature demonstrating a positive link between 
happiness and prosocial behaviours such as donating money and doing volunteer work 
(Borgonovi, 2008; Phelps, 2001; Post, 2005). Helping others also is a significant 
predictor of mental health (Schwartz et al., 2003). These findings have been extended to 
intervention studies, in which deliberate daily acts of kindness were shown to increase 
life satisfaction (Buchanan & Bardi, 2010). 
There are two common explanations for the relationship between virtue and well-
being. One explanation is that virtuous individuals are happier because virtuous 
behaviour tends to be rewarded with higher social status, respect, or social connection 
(Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Stavrova et al., 2013). In other words, acting virtuously is 
only useful insofar as it garners social rewards. Therefore, virtue is only indirectly related
to well-being and mental health, insofar as the virtuous behaviour results in positive 
social consequences such as respect, influence, or power. Indeed, altruistic behaviour in 
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general is associated with mental health benefits and protective effects, including deeper 
social integration, enhanced sense of meaning, and greater well-being (Post, 2005). A 
consequence of this theory is that acting virtuously is only perceived as beneficial if it 
garners social rewards. Therefore, in societies that do not reward virtue, virtuous people 
are not likely to experience these benefits. Evidence for this view has been demonstrated 
by showing that virtuous people are not happier than anyone else in countries where 
citizens accept fraud, dishonesty, and free-riding (Stavrova et al., 2013). 
The second view is closer to the ancient views of morality held by Aristotle and 
Patanjali: there is something about moral virtue itself that is inherently rewarding and 
healthy (Andreoni, 1990). Although this view has been pervasive through history, 
evidence to support it is limited, partially because it is difficult to isolate the social 
rewards of virtuous behaviour from the inherent reward of virtuous behaviour. However, 
it has been shown that spending money on others is a better predictor of happiness than 
spending money on oneself (Dunn et al., 2008), even if the spending is done 
anonymously (Aknin et al., 2013).
Moreover, simple acts of kindness have been shown to increase life satisfaction 
(Buchanan & Bardi, 2010). Happiness also is associated with less self-focused attention 
(Green et al., 2003), indicating that one benefit of altruistic behaviour may be the result 
of other-focused attention. 
In line with the enlightened self-interest perspective, there is some evidence for 
the proposition that ethical standards themselves can be beneficial to mental health. For 
instance, individuals with strict standards preventing fraudulent behaviour tend to be 
more satisfied with life than those with more permissive attitudes (Helliwell, 2003; 
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James, 2011). In the following section, the reconciliation model of moral centrality will 
be proposed as a potential framework for understanding the relationship between 
morality and mental health that is harmonious with this second view. Specifically, the 
integration of agency and communion may be adaptive because it represents an internal 
equilibrium between two mutually opposing drives that energize, rather than interfere 
with, each other. 
The Reconciliation Model of Moral Centrality
The reconciliation model of moral centrality was developed to explain moral 
motivation. Most early research on morality focused on the importance of moral 
reasoning, but a seminal review by Blasi (1980) showed that highly developed moral 
reasoning alone plays only a small role in predicting moral behaviour. More evidence for 
this came through Colby and Damon's (1992) qualitative study of moral exemplars. In 
their study, they selected people who were recognized to be highly moral based on a strict
criteria of moral excellence, which were formulated through collaborations with 
theologians, philosophers, and moral scholars. Their analysis revealed that people with 
lifelong commitments to moral causes do not necessarily have more sophisticated moral 
reasoning. Indeed, they found that their moral reasoning scores, based on Kohlberg's 
moral dilemmas, were not much higher than those of non-exemplars. This led to a focus 
on what is now commonly referred to as the judgment-action gap, which describes how 
people often know the right thing to do, but do not necessarily act in accordance with that
knowledge (Walker, 2004). There will always be times when moral obligations demand 
that people make real sacrifices and act against their own interests, so what happens when
doing the “right thing” is at their own expense? 
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In response to this problem, Blasi (1984) and Damon (1984) developed theories 
based on the seemingly paradoxical concept that people act morally because of their 
sense of self. Blasi's self-model explains how moral judgment leads to moral action, and 
consists of three components: responsibility, self-consistency, and the moral self. 
According to this model, for a person to act morally, certain actions must be seen as 
moral, but also as actions that the individual is responsible for doing. Such judgments of 
responsibility come from differences in moral centrality, or the salience of moral values 
for one's self-concept. Moral centrality then, describes when such moral considerations 
are central to the way a person sees, and interacts with, the world. The theory holds that a
person who has developed moral centrality will desire to act in a way that is consistent 
with their sense of self to avoid the cognitive dissonance that would result from acting in 
a way that contradicts their identity as a moral person. In essence, moral behaviour is 
explained by the degree to which a person has developed moral centrality, which causes 
them to feel responsible for acting morally and influences them to remain consistent with 
their self-concept. 
Blasi's self-model is the most comprehensive and systematic approach to 
explaining how moral cognition leads to moral action, but it does not explain how moral 
centrality develops. Congruent with Blasi's self-model, Damon (1984) developed a theory
to explain the mechanism by which people achieve moral centrality. Damon conceived of
the moral and self-systems as conceptually distinct systems that “may or may not be 
coordinated for any particular individual.” Consistent with the duty-based paradigm of 
morality, morality can be conceived of as an “externally induced constrainer of the 
antisocial, yet very real, desires of the self” (Damon, 1984, p. 110). Consistent with the 
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enlightened self-interest paradigm, morality can also be coordinated with self-interest so 
that it is perceived as “the safest and most gratifying rout toward one's enlightened self-
interest” (Damon, 1984, p. 110). Part of what distinguishes morally developed people 
(i.e., moral exemplars), according to this theory, is that they have integrated these 
conceptually distinct systems by developing moral centrality. In essence, moral centrality
is developed when one's self and moral systems are successfully coordinated and 
integrated. 
Evidence for this model of moral centrality was demonstrated in Damon and 
Colby's qualitative study of moral exemplars. In their book, Some Do Care: 
Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment (1992), they identified and interviewed 23 
individuals who were deemed by “twenty-two moral philosophers, theologians, ethicists, 
historians and social scientists” as fitting the criteria for being a moral exemplar. What 
characterizes the most highly moral people, they found, is the unification of their self and
morality: “These men and women have vigorously pursued their individual and moral 
goals simultaneously, viewing them in fact as one and the same” (Colby and Damon, 
1992, p. 300). Of most importance is that none of the moral exemplars “saw their moral 
choices as an exercise in self-sacrifice” (p. 300). Colby and Damon ultimately saw that 
moral exemplars experience acting morally as acting in one's own interest. 
Frimer and Walker (2009) formulated the reconciliation model of moral centrality
to clarify the exact nature of the relationship between the moral and self systems by 
reconciling two opposing viewpoints. The first view, which they refer to as the 
interference hypothesis, is that the communal and agentic drives are fundamentally 
opposed to each other: Agency interferes with other-advancing communal motives and 
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thus must be quelled in order to achieve moral excellence. This perspective was held by 
psychologists such as Bakan (1966) and Schwartz (1992). Schwartz developed a system 
of ten universal values, and he found that people with values such as benevolence and 
self-transcendence were less likely to hold self-interest related values. Like Bakan, he 
concluded that self-interest and benevolence were mutually exclusive, and that self-
interest needed to be subdued for people to become moral. 
The second view, which Frimer and Walker (2009) refer to as the synergy 
hypothesis, maintains that morality is communally motivated, but construes agency as an 
inherently amoral force. According to this view, agency only serves to energize motives, 
regardless of whether they are moral or not. Agency provides energy to, but does not 
fundamentally direct, motivation. 
The reconciliation model of moral centrality combines insights from both 
interference hypothesis and the synergy hypothesis. Similar to the interference 
hypothesis, the reconciliation model of moral centrality holds that agency and 
communion are normally opposing drives that develop separately and which are often at 
odds with each other. According to the model, at some point during adolescence, the 
individual has to choose between either abandoning agency, abandoning communion, or 
integrating them in a sort of Ericksonian crisis. Consistent with the synergy hypothesis, 
these systems can be coordinated and integrated, which represents the successful 
resolution of this Ericksonian crisis.
Moral centrality then, describes this state in which agency and communion are 
integrated and highly developed. The successful integration of these drives leads to a 
symbiotic relationship in which the self and moral systems energize each other. In other 
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words, moral centrality describes a state in which communion is a deeply held belief that 
becomes part of one’s self-concept. Thus, holding community promoting values is no 
longer perceived as a sacrifice. Rather, the object of agency becomes the realization of 
communal goals, and conversely, breaching these values becomes an aggression on the 
self.
To test this theory, Frimer and Walker (2009) developed and validated the first 
empirical measurement of moral centrality – the values embedded in narrative (VEIN). A
VEIN can be understood as a value that is implicitly or explicitly endorsed in someone's 
speech. VEINs are coded according to the values in Schwartz's Value Survey (SVS; 
Schwartz, 1992), which captures ten universal value types: power, achievement, 
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, 
and security. These values are separated into quadrants, which are placed around a 
circumplex so that values on the opposite side of the circumplex are conceptually 
opposed to each other. Schwartz labels two conceptually opposed quadrants as self-
enhancement and self-transcendence, but we use the terminology of agency and 
communion to stay consistent with Frimer and Walker (2009). The self-enhancement 
values of achievement (personal success and competence) and power (dominance and 
wealth) make up the category of agency. The self-transcendent values of benevolence 
(concern for others) and universalism (concerns for generalized others and the 
environment) make up the category of communion. These values are differentiated by the
object of concern, where benevolence is focused on the welfare of one’s own group, and 
universalism is focused on the welfare of all people and nature. 
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To measure moral centrality, the VEIN coding system is applied to self-narrative 
data, and the interweaving of agentic and communal themes in the same thought is 
treated as “an empirical projection of the latent moral centrality construct” (Frimer & 
Walker, 2009, p.1671). Moral centrality is represented by the frequency with which these
themes tend to appear together rather than separately. It is also important to note that, in 
contrast to previous methods that measure the prevalence of these themes on a macro-
level, the emphasis rests on how these themes are integrated in a single thought. Thus, a 
high prevalence of agentic and communal themes in a narrative would not indicate moral 
centrality if these themes are associated with different trains of thought and entertained 
separately. 
In line with the reconciliation model, the tendency to coordinate agentic and 
communal values has been shown to be associated with various aspects of morality. In 
one study, this tendency positively predicted moral behaviour (Frimer & Walker, 2009). 
In a second study, recipients of a national award for either volunteerism or advancing 
humanitarian causes were more likely to integrate agentic and communal themes within 
their personal narratives compared to a demographically matched control group (Frimer 
et al., 2011). These findings indicate that agency and communion can be adaptively 
reconciled, and that this reconciliation is associated with moral and prosocial behaviour.
These findings highlight the utility of this coding system as a measurement of 
moral development. The VEIN coding system also has several properties that make it 
especially valuable as a measurement of morality. First, participants are unaware of the 
construct being measured, which reduces demand characteristics. Second, because 
participants are blind to the coding system, it reduces problems related to social 
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desirability; participants would not know how to make themselves look better even if 
they wanted to. The VEIN method ultimately offers a way of measuring a person's moral 
motivations without ever cuing them to think about their own personal morality or even 
the fact that morality is being measured. 
The VEIN method also can discriminate people who are perceived as moral 
exemplars. Frimer et al. (2012) asked 102 social scientists to evaluate the moral qualities 
of people in a TIME magazine list of the 20th century's most influential figures. In a 
second study, they separated the 15 highest-scoring individuals to form a moral exemplar 
group and the 15 lowest-scoring exemplars to compose a control group. Using the VEIN 
method to analyze their speeches, they correctly predicted that people in the moral 
exemplar group would exhibit more integration of agentic and communal motives in their
speeches than the lowest 15, thus providing evidence for the concurrent validity of this 
method. This finding is important because moral virtue is a complex and multifaceted 
construct that cannot be measured or defined with any single metric. Thus, one standard 
for determining whether someone embodies virtue is the court of public opinion, and this 
study demonstrates that this measurement of moral centrality is harmonious with the 
court of public opinion. 
Moral Centrality and Mental Health
Although the reconciliation model was developed to understand moral 
development, it can also be used as a general framework for examining the relationship 
between morality and mental health. Frimer and Walker (2009, p. 1671) write that “as 
each motive becomes more elaborated and increasingly central to the individual, the two 
conflicting motivational systems come into strive; their segregated coexistence produces 
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an unsustainable crisis.” This tension becomes a source of internal disequilibrium that 
can be resolved in one of three ways: denying agency, denying communion, or 
attempting to reconcile the two motivational systems. Moral centrality represents a 
successful negotiation between the agentic and communal motivational systems that has 
been integrated into one’s personality. 
The reconciliation model also provides an indication of how moral development 
might contribute to well-being. Not only does the development of moral centrality result 
in a reduced internal disequilibrium within a person's motivational system, but the nature 
of this integration is synergistic. As described by Frimer and Walker, “agency 'breathes 
life' into communion and communion gives agency a greater purpose” (Frimer and 
Walker, 2009, p. 1677). So rather than finding a way for the opposing motivational 
systems to negotiate, reconciliation describes a state in which the opposing motivations 
support and energise each other. Thus, the coordination of opposing drives may become a
naturally symbiotic source of energy: communion galvanizes agency, which exerts itself 
in a way that enhances social relationships, which in turn engenders more agentic energy.
If this is the case, the development of moral centrality should promote the optimal 
satisfaction of these drives with less energy. 
Finally, the reconciliation model may also show how moral centrality can 
promote the attainment of eudaimonic well-being specifically. As described above, the 
eudaimonic perspective of well-being consists in the actualization of one’s true potential 
as a human being (Waterman et al., 2010). Huta (2013) defines the eudaimonic 
orientation as “seeking to use and develop the best in oneself, in ways that are congruent 
with one’s values and true self.” In contrast with hedonia, the pursuit of pleasure as an 
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end in itself, positive subjective experiences are a byproduct, not the goal, of eudaimonic 
pursuits. Eudaimonic well-being can be broadly understood then, as the degree to which 
this way of living has successfully been attained. As with the reconciliation model of 
moral centrality, this definition implies agency oriented motivations of self-development 
that are in-line with deeply held beliefs about how one should relate to others and act in 
the world, which can be understood as communal values. If moral centrality describes the
synergistic integration of agentic and communal drives, it follows that higher moral 
centrality should more easily allow for the attainment of eudaimonic well-being, along 
with the positive subjective experiences with which it is associated.
The Present Study
In the present study, the relationship between moral centrality and mental health 
was assessed. University students completed a battery of open-ended questions in which 
they wrote about their values, life goals, and personal strivings. This was followed by a 
battery of self-report measures assessing depression, self-esteem, anxiety, the presence of
meaning in their lives, positive and negative affect, interpersonal functioning, and overall
well-being. The open-ended questions were coded using the VEIN system, which codes 
for themes of agency and communion using the constructs in Schwartz's Value Survey 
(1992). Consistent with Frimer and Walker's (2009) work, moral centrality was 
operationalized as the degree to which participants wove together themes of agency and 
communion into their writing. 
In addition, a self-report measure of altruistic behaviour was administered. As 
previously discussed, an abundance of research has shown that prosocial behaviour is 
associated with positive psychological effects (Borgonovi, 2008; Phelps, 2001; Post, 
21
2005). Therefore, to control for the expected psychological benefits of prosocial 
behaviour, a self-report measure of altruistic behaviour was used to control for these 
psychological benefits.
Research Questions and Aims
The proposed study was designed to answer the overarching research question: Is 
moral centrality associated with healthy psychological functioning? In relation to this 
question, the proposed research addressed the three following research questions: First, 
does overall moral centrality predict markers of mental health and well-being? Second, is 
this association maintained after controlling for the potential positive effects of altruistic 
behaviour? Third, which aspects of mental health, if any, are most associated with the 
development of moral centrality? 
Hypothesis 1. The integration of agency and communion will positively predict 
well-being, the presence of meaning in life, positive affect, and self-esteem; and 
negatively predict depression, anxiety, negative affect, and interpersonal problems. 
Hypothesis 2. The integration of agency and communion will account for 
variance in these markers of well-being and mental health after controlling for any 





This survey used a multiple regression analysis to test the research hypotheses. 
The predictors were the moral centrality index (MCI) and self-reported altruism (SRA). 
The outcome variables were depression (BDI), state and trait anxiety (STAI-S and STAI-
T), positive and negative affect (PANAS-P and PANAS-N), the presence of meaning in 
life (MLQ-P), self-esteem (RSES) and well-being (QEWB). Altruism was used to 
statistically control for the potential effects of altruistic behaviour on mental health.
Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Windsor Participant Pool. 
Because the aim of this study was to test whether the development of moral centrality is 
associated with mental health and well-being, there were no explicit inclusion criteria. In 
total, 130 participants completed the online survey. 112 of the participants identified as 
female, 16 identified as male, and the gender of 2 participants was unknown. The mean 
age of participants was 21.47 years (SD = 4.28, range = 18-43 years). Reported ethnic 
background was as follows: 5.2% African, 4.3% Canadian, 5.3% East Asian, 69.0% 
European, 0.8% First Nations, 3.1% Middle Eastern, 2.6% Mixed Ethnicity, 5.2% South 
Asian, and 0.8% South or Central American. In terms of years of education, 17.69% were
in first year, 23.84% were in second year, 26.15% were in third year, 26.92% were in 
fourth year, and 5.38% had attended university for more than four years. 
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Measures
Demographic Questionnaire. Demographics were collected using questions 
about age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, and family background. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996). The Beck Depression
Inventory–Second edition (BDI-II) is a 21-item self-report measure that assesses the 
severity of cognitive, affective, and neurovegetative symptoms of depression. Participants
respond by indicating the degree to which each item accurately represents the severity of 
the symptom over the past 2 weeks. Items such as “sadness” and “loss of interest” are 
rated on a scale from 0 (absence of symptom) to 3 (severe level of symptom). Higher 
scores indicate greater depressive symptoms. In the present study, internal consistency 
for the BDI-II was .94. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). The 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a 20-item self-report measure that 
assesses positive and negative affect. The items are arranged in two subscales. The 
positive affect (PA) subscale includes items such as “inspired”, whereas the negative 
affect (NA) subscale includes items such as “jittery”. The state version of this scale was 
used in the present study, with participants reporting how they feel “right now, that is, at 
the present moment.” Participants respond using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
slightly or none at all) to 5 (extremely), with higher scores indicating greater positive or 
negative affect. In the present study, internal consistency for the negative affect subscale 
was .93 and .92 for the positive affect subscale.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965; 1979). The 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) is a 10-item self-report measure that assesses trait 
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self-esteem. Items such as “On the whole I am satisfied with myself” are scored on a 4-
point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect
higher trait self-esteem. In the present study, internal consistency for the RSES was .92.
The Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being (QEWB; Waterman et al., 
2010). The Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being (QEWB) is a 21-item self-report 
measure that assesses six facets of eudaimonic well-being: meaning, self-expression, 
intense involvement in activities that contribute to life goals, sense of accomplishment 
and investment of effort. Items such as “My life is centered around a set of core beliefs 
that give meaning to my life.” are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect higher eudaimonic well-being. In 
the present study, internal consistency for the QEWB was .88.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983). The 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) is a 40-item self-report measure that assesses state 
and trait anxiety symptoms. The items are divided into two subscales. The state subscale 
instructs participants to report how they feel at the present moment and it includes items 
such as “I am worried.” Participants respond on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very 
much so). The trait subscale instructs participants to report how they generally feel, and it
includes items such as “I worry too much over something that doesn’t really matter.” 
Participants respond on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). Higher scores 
indicate greater anxiety symptoms. In the present study, internal consistency for the state 
subscale was .94 and the .94 for the trait subscale.
The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger, 2006). The MLQ is a 10-
item measure of life meaning that consists of two subscales: the Presence of Meaning in 
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Life (MLQ-P) and the Search for Meaning in Life. Only the Presence of Meaning 
subscale is used in the present study. The Presence of Meaning in Life subscale includes 
items like “My life has a clear sense of purpose,” and are rated on a 7-point scale from 1 
(“absolutely untrue”) to 7 (“absolutely true”). Items are summed to obtain a total and 
higher scores reflect the presence of meaning. In the present study, internal consistency 
for the Presence of Meaning subscale was .89. 
The Inventory of Interersonal Problems-32 (IIP-32; Horowitz et al., 2000). 
The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP) is a 32-item self-report measure that 
assesses interpersonal difficulties. The items comprise eight subscales that correspond to 
the eight octants of the interpersonal circumplex (Kiesler, 1996): domineering/controlling
(DC), vindictive/self-centered (VS), cold/distant (CD, socially inhibited (SI), non-
assertive (NA), overly accommodating (OA), self-sacrificing (SS), and intrusive/needy 
(IN). Items such as, “I am affected by another person’s misery too much” are rated from 
0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). Higher scores indicate greater interpersonal problems. In 
the present study, internal consistency for the sum of IIP-32 subscales was .95.
Self-Report Altruism Scale (SRA; Rushton et al., 1981). The SRA is a 20-item 
self-report measure of altruistic behaviour, measuring the frequency with which the 
respondents engage in altruistic acts. Items like “I have given money to charity” are rated 
on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“very often”). Higher scores indicate 
more frequent self-reported pro-social behaviour. In the present study, internal 
consistency for the SRA was .88. 
 Validity checks. A total of four validity checks were used to screen for careless 
responding. To ensure participants are reading the items, the IIP-32, BDI-II, RSES and 
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SRA each had an item added that instructed participants to select a particular response. 
For example, “If you have read this statement, please select ‘Mostly Disagree’.”
Modified Personal Strivings List (MPSL). The personal strivings list is an 
open-ended template designed to elicit a person's characteristic motives and personal 
strivings. It is based on the Personal Strivings List (PSL; Emmons, 1999), but has been 
modified to incorporate queries for each response. Each response is followed by a query 
asking why a particular goal or value is important to the participant. The PSL has been 
shown to be effective in eliciting expressions of agentic and communal motivation 
(Frimer et al., 2011). 
Personal Values and Goals (PVG). The PVG consists of eight open-ended 
questions asking about personal values and life goals. Each question is followed by a 
query asking why a particular goal or value is important to the participant. Many 
questions are modified from the Self-Understanding Interview, Transmogrified (Frimer &
Walker, 2009) so that they can be answered online without the need for queries from an 
interviewer.
Values Embedded in Narrative Coding Manual (VEIN; Frimer et al., 2009). 
The VEIN coding manual contains instructions for evaluating the implicit value 
orientations of participants using the Values Embedded in Narrative coding procedure. 
This procedure was developed to code implicitly endorsed values, based on Schwartz's 
ten universal values (1992), from a personal narrative. The coding manual provides a 
basic definition of each value, along with specific inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
coding each VEIN from narrative. According to the manual (Frimer et al., 2009), inter-
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rater reliability for the relevant VEINS in this study have been substantial (89% to 95% 
agreement, κ = 67 to 82). 
Responses are separated and referred to using a word that characterizes the 
response, called a 'stem'. For instance, ' baseball' may be the stem for a paragraph on why 
someone likes to play baseball. The basic unit of analysis is referred to as a chunk, which 
consists of a single response stem along with any associated elaboration on its 
significance to the participant (e.g., any response to a follow-up question like “Why is 
___ important to you?”). The rater then analyzes each chunk and determines which 
values are present according to the criteria explicated in the VEIN coding manual. In the 
present study, stems were used only if the participant developed two conceptually distinct
themes in answering a single question. Otherwise, chunks were identified using the 
associated question number (e.g., MPSL-1). See Appendix M and Appendix N for the 
complete list of questions. 
Procedure
This study consisted of a single online questionnaire with two parts: a series of 
open-ended questions, followed by a series of self-report measures. Participants were 
recruited from the University of Windsor Participant Pool system and given 1.5 course 
credits for participation. Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to better 
understand how personal narratives and values relate to well-being. Before completing 
the survey, participants were provided with an informed consent form. They indicated 
their consent by typing in their name. 
After indicating their consent, participants completed the online survey, which 
took an hour and a half, and was worth 1.5 bonus points. For each open-ended response, 
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the participant was prompted to give a short explanation about their answer. The open-
ended questions were followed by the battery of self-report measures listed above. At the 
end of the survey, participants were shown the Post-Study Debriefing Form (Appendix 
C), which explained the purpose of the study. Participants signed the bottom of the 
debriefing form to indicate their consent to data retention after being told the true purpose
of the study. 
VEIN Coding Procedure. The implicit value orientation of the participants was 
coded using the VEIN coding manual to analyze the open-ended questions. Responses 
are separated and referred to using a word that characterizes the response, called a 'stem'. 
For instance, ' baseball' may be the stem for a paragraph on why someone likes to play 
baseball. The basic unit of analysis is referred to as a chunk, which consists of a single 
response stem along with any associated elaboration on its significance to the participant 
(e.g., any response to a follow-up question like “Why is ___ important to you?”). The 
rater then analyzes each chunk and determines which values are present according to the 
criteria explicated in the VEIN coding manual. Each chunk is coded for every VEIN, so it
is possible for a single chunk to endorse multiple values. In the present study, stems were 
used only if the participant developed two conceptually distinct themes in answering a 
single question. Otherwise, chunks were identified using the associated question number 
(e.g., MPSL-1). See Appendix M and Appendix N for the complete list of questions. 
Moral centrality was coded by calculating the frequency with which participants 
interweave themes of agency and communion in the same chunk. See Appendix L for an 
example of how chunks were coded. All coding was performed by the primary 
investigator and a single research assistant who was trained by the PI to code narrative 
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chunks using the VEIN coding manual (Frimer et al., 2009). The PI and research assistant
practiced coding each VEIN using examples provided in the VEIN coding manual and 
then met in-person on three separate occasions to discuss disagreements. 
Reliability. After three in-person training sessions and a single online video 
discussion, inter-rater reliability for value coding was assessed using a subset of the 
collected data that would not be included in the final study. In total, this subset included 
155 chunks. Across the four VEINs, reliability was substantial (90% to 96% agreement, κ
= 72 to 81), and exceeded the minimal requirements recommended in the coding manual 
(Frimer et al., 2009). 
Metrics for moral centrality coding. Each participant's pattern of responses on 
the open-ended questions were organized in a data matrix which formed a unique profile 
of the participant's implicitly endorsed values. Responses were organized by the question 
number, and further divided into stems if the participant developed two conceptually 
distinct themes in response to a single question. Responses were listed in the rows and 
VEINS along columns (see Appendix L for an example). The cells were filled with 1’s to
signify the presence of a VEIN, and 0’s to signify the absence of a VEIN. Summary 
scores for each column were calculated by dividing the total number of hits by the 
number of stems for that individual. These summary scores were interpreted as 
measurements of the degree to which those values are important to the individual. 
An additional series of columns were used to measure agency, communion and 
moral centrality. The agency column recorded if either power or achievement was 
contained in the chunk and the communion column recorded if either benevolence or 
universalism was coded from the chunk. Summary scores were calculated in the same 
30
way as described above. The moral centrality column recorded the frequency with which 
a person integrated agentic and communal themes in the same sentence fragment. The 
moral centrality index (MCI) was calculated as the probability of overlap between agency
and communion when at least one of the values was present. This number was multiplied 
by 100 to give the frequency with which a person integrates agentic and communal 
themes in their narratives, with a higher number representing more integration. For 
example, an MCI of 75 indicates that agency and communion appear together 75% of the 
time.  Thus, MCI scores may theoretically range between 0 and 100. This process was 
repeated for all possible agency-communion VEIN combinations for the purpose of 
exploratory analysis. These combinations include power-benevolence, power-




Approach to Data Analysis
All statistical analyses were performed using R for Linux (Version 3.6.3). First, 
the data were examined for out of range values. Answers to validity check questions and 
missing responses then were examined. Next, the assumptions of multiple regression 
were assessed along with a descriptive analysis of relevant variables. 
Data Cleaning
Validity check. The data were first checked for invalid cases. Eleven participants 
failed at least one of the four validity check items for inattentive responding and were 
removed from subsequent analysis. After these cases were removed, 119 cases were 
retained for subsequent analyses. A power analysis was subsequently performed to 
calculate the potential for Type II error. Assuming a medium effect size (f2 = .13), with a 
sample size of 119 and two predictors, the calculated power was .95.
Imputation of missing values. After the removal of invalid cases, less than 0.1% 
of values were missing on each individual measure. Given the scarcity of missing 
responses, mean substitution was deemed to be an appropriate solution (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Missing responses were replaced with item-level response means based on 
all non-missing scores. 
Assumptions of Multiple Regression
Prior to the main analysis, the assumptions of multiple linear regression were 
evaluated. The data were first examined for homoscedasticity of residuals and linearity. 
Visual inspection of standardised residual vs predicted residual plots revealed that 
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residuals were randomly scattered above and below the zero-residual line. Scatterplots 
did not reveal any non-linear patterns. Therefore, homoscedasticity and linearity were 
assumed to have been met.
The assumption of normality was assessed by standardized scores for skewness 
and kurtosis with a cut-off of z = | 3.29 |, and the Shapiro-Wilke statistic. Investigation 
revealed that STAI-S, STAI-T, QEWB and SRA passed S-W with skewness and kurtosis 
both in the normal range. PANAS-P, MLQ-P, RSES, IIP-32 and MC all violated S-W, but
skewness and kurtosis remained in the normal range. The variables BDI-II and PANAS-
N both violated S-W and were significantly positively skewed. Univariate normality is 
not an explicit assumption of multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), so no 




Descriptive Statistics for All Measures
Variable M SD Median Range
BDI-II 14.12 11.44 11 0 - 50
QEWB 74.27 11.01 74 44 - 103
STAI-State 43.83 12.10 43 20 - 75
STAI-Trait 44.82 11.88 45 22 - 71
RSES 19.39 5.95 19 5 - 30
PANAS-P 27.97 9.37 29 11 - 47
PANAS-N 19.08 8.50 16 10 - 44
SRA 54.70 11.9 53 31 - 88
MLQ-P 24.61 6.17 25 10 - 35
IIP-32 18.64 5.21 19.25 8 - 28.67
MCI 26.62 16.68 25 0 - 75
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II; QEWB = Questionnaire for Eudaimonic 
Well-Being; STAI-S = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State); STAI-T = State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Trait); RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PANAS-P = Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (Positive Affect); PANAS-N = Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (Negative Affect); SRA = Self-Report Altruism Scale; MLQ-P = 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Presence); IIP-32 = Inventory of Interpersonal Problems 
(Total); MCI = Moral Centrality Index.
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Based on a cut-off of z = |3.29|, one BDI score was a univariate outlier and was 
winsorized by changing it to the highest non-outlier BDI value. Outliers on independence
of observations were then inspected using Mahalanobis distance. None of the 
observations exceeded the Mahalanobis distance cutoff (χ2 = 13.82, p < .001), and thus all
cases were retained. No influential cases were detected using Cook’s distance for any of 
the regression models, and thus all cases were retained. Multicollinearity was examined 
next using variance inflation factors and intercorrelations. Bother predictor variables 
were well below the cutoffs of VIF < 10 and tolerance < .1 (VIF = 1.02, tolerance = 0.98)
, and their correlation was below the r = |.80| cutoff. Thus, the assumption of no 
multicollinearity was met. Full descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are 
shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2
Zero-Order Correlations for All Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. BDI-II           
2. QEWB -.49**          
3. STAI-State .77** -.51**         
4. STAI-Trait .79** -.55** .88**        
5. RSES -.65** .57** -.65** -.78**       
6. PANAS-P -.41** .46** -.38** -.41** .37**      
7. PANAS-N .63** -.33** .71** .65** -.49** .08     
8. SRA .06 .26** -.01 -.01 .06 .23* .08    
9. MLQ-P -.48** .66** -.51** -.59** .57** .49** -.21* .10   
10. IIP-T .48** -.31** .51** .59** -.46** -.06 .47** .22* -.25**  
11. MCI -.20* .36** -.32** -.26** .26** .14 -.22* .15 .14 -.10
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory II; QEWB = Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being; STAI-State = State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (State); STAI-Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait); RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale; PANAS-P = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Positive Affect); PANAS-N = Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (Negative Affect); SRA = Self-Report Altruism Scale; MLQ-P = Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Presence); 
IIP-T = Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Total); MCI = Moral Centrality Index.
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Main Analyses
To test the hypotheses, separated hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
conducted for each of the dependent variables: depression (BDI-II), state and trait anxiety
(STAI-S and STAI-T), positive and negative affect (PANAS-P and PANAS-N), self-
esteem (RSES), the presence of meaning (MLQ-P), well-being (QEWB) and 
interpersonal problems (IIP-32). For each model, altruism (SRA) was entered in the first 
step to control for the potential effects of altruistic behaviour. It was retained in the final 
regression model only if it significantly contribution to the model. Otherwise, it was 
removed. The moral centrality index (MCI) was entered in Step 2 to determine whether it
accounted for unique variance over and above normal measurements of altruistic 
behaviour. Following Rothman (1990), familywise error-rate corrections were not used 
for a priori generated hypotheses.
Depression. The first regression model examined depression. It was hypothesized
that moral centrality would negatively predict depression scores after accounting for the 
effect of altruistic behaviour. Altruism was entered as a first step but did not significantly 
contribute to the regression model (p = .500), and therefore was removed from the model.
The model containing only moral centrality as a predictor was significant F(1,117) = 
5.07, p = .026. As hypothesised, higher moral centrality was associated with reduced 
depression, β = -.20, t(117) = -2.25, p = .045.
Table 3
Final Regression Model for Beck Depression Inventory II
Predictor b SE b b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2
(Intercept) 17.84 1.95 [13.98, 21.70] - 9.16 <.001 -.20 .042
MCI -0.14 0.62 [-.26, -0.02] -0.20 -2.25 .026
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Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Eudaimonic Well-Being. The next regression analysis examined well-being. It 
was predicted that moral centrality would positively predict well-being after accounting 
for the effect of altruistic behaviour. Step 1 of the model was significant, F(1,117) = 8.67,
p = .004, and accounted for 6.9% of the variance in well-being. In Step 2, adding moral 
centrality significantly improved the prediction of well-being, ΔF(1,116) = 14.30, p 
< .001, accounting for an additional 10.2% of the variance. The complete model 
accounted for 17.1% of the variance in well-being (refer to Table 3 for a full summary of 
the model).
Table 4
Final Regression Model for Well-Being
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2  ΔR
1 (Intercept) 60.97 4.62 [51.83, 70.12] 13.2 <.001 .26 .069
Altruism 0.24 0.08 [0.08, 0.41] 0.26 2.95 .003
2 (Intercept) 57.77 4.46 [48.94, 66.60] 12.96 <.001 .171 .102 
Altruism 0.20 0.08 [0.04, 0.35] 0.21 2.50 .014 .26
MCI 0.21 0.06 [0.10, 0.33] 0.32 3.78 <.001 .36
 Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
State Anxiety. It was hypothesized that moral centrality would negatively predict 
anxiety scores after accounting for the effect of altruistic behaviour. Altruism did not 
significantly predict state anxiety (p = .947) and was removed from the final model. The 
model containing only moral centrality as a predictor was significant, F(1,117) = 13.38, p
< .001. As hypothesised, higher moral centrality was associated with reduced state 
anxiety, β = -.32 t(117) = -3.66, p < .001. 
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Table 5
Final Regression Model for State Anxiety
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2
(Intercept) 50.02 1.99 [46.07, 53.96] 25.10 <.001 -.32 .103
MCI -0.23 0.06 [-0.36, -0.11] -0.32 -3.66 <.001
Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Trait Anxiety. Altruism did not significantly predict trait anxiety (p = .944) and 
was dropped from the final model. The model containing only moral centrality as a 
predictor was significant, F(1,117) = 8.46, p = .004. As hypothesised, higher moral 
centrality was associated with reduced trait anxiety, β = -.26 t(117) = -2.91, p < .004. 
Table 6
Final Regression Model for Trait Anxiety
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2
(Intercept) 49.74 2.00 [45.79, 53.69] 24.93 <.001 -.26 .067
MCI -0.18 0.06 [-0.31, -0.06] -0.26 -2.91 .004
Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Self-Esteem. It was hypothesized that moral centrality would positively predict 
self-esteem after accounting for the effect of altruistic behaviour. Altruism was entered as
a first step but did not significantly contribute to the regression model (p = 0.488), and 
therefore was removed from the analysis. The regression model with moral centrality 
predicting self-esteem was significant F(1,117) = 8.63, p = .004. As hypothesised, higher 
moral centrality was associated with higher self-esteem, β = 0.26, t(117) = 2.94, p = .004.
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Table 7
Final Regression Model for Self-Esteem
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2
(Intercept) 16.90 0.99 [14.92, 18.88] 16.92 <.001 .26 .069
MCI 0.09 0.03 [0.03, 0.16] 0.26 2.94 .004
Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Positive Affect. The next regression analysis tested the hypothesis that moral 
centrality would predict positive affect after accounting for altruism. Step 1 of the model 
was significant, F(1,117) = 6.64, p = .011, and accounted for 5.4% of the variance in 
positive affect. In contrast to expectations, adding moral centrality in Step 2 did not 
significantly improve the prediction of positive affect, ΔF(1,116) = 1.45, p = 0.232. The 
complete model is displayed in Table 7.
Table 8
Final Regression Model for Positive Affect
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2  ΔR
1 (Intercept) 17.98 3.96 [10.13, 25.83] 4.54 <.001 .054
Altruism 0.18 0.07 [0.04, 0.32] 0.23 2.58 .011 .23
2 (Intercept) 17.06 4.03 [9.08, 25.04] 4.23 <.001 .065 .012
Altruism 0.17 0.07 [0.03, 0.31] 0.22 2.37 .019 .23
MCI 0.06 0.05 [-0.04, 0.16] 0.11 1.20 .232 .14
 Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Negative Affect. It was hypothesised that moral centrality would negatively 
predict negative affect after accounting for the effect of altruistic behaviour. Altruism 
was entered as a first step but did not a significantly contribute to the regression model (p
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= 0.414), and therefore was removed from the analysis. The final model with moral 
centrality predicting negative affect was significant F(1,119) = 5.94, p = 0.016. As 
hypothesised, higher moral centrality was associated with lower negative affect, β = -.22, 
t(117) = -2.44, p = .016. 
Table 9
Final Regression Model for Negative Affect
Predictor b SE b 95% CI β t Sig. R R2
(Intercept) 22.06 1.44 [14.92, 18.88] - 15.30 <.001 -.22 .048
MCI -0.11 0.04 [-0.20, -0.02] -.22 -2.44 .016
Note. MCI = Moral Centrality Index
Interpersonal Problems. It was hypothesized that moral centrality would be 
associated with less interpersonal problems after accounting for the effects of altruistic 
behaviour. Contrary to expectations, altruistic behaviour significantly predicted the 
presence of interpersonal problems, F(1, 117) = 5.94, p = .016. The addition of moral 
centrality did not significantly contribute to the model, F(1, 116) = 2.12, p = .148. 
The Presence of Meaning. It was hypothesised that moral centrality would be 
associated with a higher sense of meaning in life after accounting for the effect of 
altruistic behaviour. In contrast to the research hypothesis, regression models were not 
significant when altruism (F(1, 117) = 1.14, p = .287) or moral centrality (F(1, 117) = 
2.23, p = .138) were used as predictors.
Exploratory Analysis
Exploratory analyses were conducted to further investigate the relationship 
between the VEINs and the outcome variables. Given that agency and communion have 
been shown to be associated with well-being (Garcia et al., 2015), the relationship 
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between the frequency of each VEIN and the outcome variables were first assessed. To 
test this, multiple regression analyses were conducted for each outcome variable with all 
four VEINs (power, achievement, benevolence and universalism) entered as predictors. 
Power was significantly related to altruism (r = .21, p = .025), well-being (r = .20, p = 
0.032), and positive affect (r = .23, p = 0.013). Achievement, universalism, and 
benevolence were not significantly associated with any of the outcome variables. 
VEIN Combinations. To further clarify results, a second exploratory analysis 
tested all possible agency-communion VEIN combinations as predictors of the main 
outcome variables. These combinations include power-benevolence, power-universalism, 
achievement-universalism, and achievement-benevolence. As with the moral centrality 
index, these metrics measure the frequency with which the overlap of these themes occur 
when at least one of the values is present.  
Analyses were conducted using semi-partial Pearson’s correlation, controlling for 
altruism. This resulted in 36 analyses, shown in Table 9 below. Given the large number 
of conditions, there is a heightened probability of Type 1 error. However, the primary 
goal of these analyses was to reveal overarching patterns in the data in order to identify 
whether a specific agency-communion combination accounted for the overall results. 
Thus, the significance of these associations is used only insofar as they are indicative of a
general pattern, 
The power-benevolence combination was significantly associated with less state 
anxiety and increased well-being. The achievement-benevolence combination largely 
mirrored the associations between moral centrality and the outcome variables. As with 
moral centrality, achievement-benevolence was associated with less depression, negative 
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affect, trait and state anxiety, and more self-esteem and well-being. In addition, 
achievement-benevolence also was associated with increased presence of meaning and 
decreased interpersonal problems. The correlations between achievement-benevolence 














MCI -.22* .11 -.23* .26** .12 .33*** -.32** -.26** -.13
PO-BE -.16 .13 -.16 .09 .02 .19* -.21* -.14 -.04 
AC-BE -.23* .07 -.24** .35*** .29** .37*** -.31*** -.31*** -.20*
AC-UN .02 .03 -.02 -.01 .10 .07 -.06 -.04 -.06
PO-UN .00 -.11 -.04 -.04 -.02 -.07 -.03 -.07 .01
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory II; QEWB = Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being; STAI-State = State-Trait Anxiety In-
ventory (State); STAI-Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait); RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; PANAS-P = Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Positive Affect); PANAS-N = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Negative Affect); SRA = Self-Re-
port Altruism Scale; MLQ-P = Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Presence); IIP-T = Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Total); MCI =
Moral Centrality Index; PO-BE = Power-Benevolence; AC-BE = Achievement-Benevolence; AC-UN = Achievement-Universalism; 




Moral behaviour has long been associated with well-being, but the nature of this 
relationship is not fully understood. In this study, the reconciliation model of moral 
centrality was proposed as a framework for understanding the psychological benefits of 
morality. According to the reconciliation model, agency and communion are dual 
motivational systems that are normally in tension, creating an internal disequilibrium. 
This disequilibrium can result in a suboptimal psychological adjustment caused by the 
tendency to satisfy one drive at the cost of the other (Frimer & Walker, 2009). According 
to Frimer and Walker (2009), this state is most adaptively overcome by developing moral
centrality, which occurs when agency and communion are reconciled and coordinated 
whereby the satisfaction of one implies the satisfaction of the other. This resolves the 
tension in favour of a synergistic integration of agency and communion, whereby agency 
energizes communion, and communion infuses agency with meaning. If this is the case, 
moral centrality may also contribute to better mental health and overall well-being. 
The overarching purpose of this study was to serve as a first step towards 
investigating this claim by testing the association between moral centrality, and mental 
health and well-being. In the present study, moral centrality was operationally defined as 
the degree to which a person integrates agentic with communal values in narratives about 
important values. This allows a single action to be construed as satisfying both agentic 
and communal values simultaneously, thus overcoming the dilemma described above. 
For instance, participant #42 writes: 
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I believe heavily in self betterment and working to be the kindest, strongest 
(physically, mentally and emotionally) and most well rounded person I can be. 
Family is my primary motivator, my dream is to be a dad one day, but more 
importantly I want to be a pillar that can uplift and support my family and always 
be there when others need me.
This participant is demonstrating moral centrality by interweaving the agentic 
theme of achievement with the communal theme of benevolence. The participant strives 
for self-improvement, but the ultimate reason for this self-improvement is so that he can 
help other people and to be a ‘pillar that can uplift and support [his] family.’ Thus, by 
pursuing the normally self-oriented value of achievement, which serves as its own 
reward, the participant’s strivings are infused with additional meaning and purpose. His 
goal satisfies his needs for competence and for connection with others simultaneously 
without having to sacrifice one for the other. 
Participant #83 similarly demonstrates moral centrality in discussing her 
motivations for performing well at her job. She writes: “I work with a vulnerable 
population and continually bettering myself will allow me to be tolerant with them and 
provide them with the best care that I can.” This motivation to do well at her job 
demonstrates moral centrality because it satisfies her need for achievement while 
simultaneously giving her the feeling that she is having a positive effect on the world 
around her. 
It was hypothesised that the tendency to weave agentic and communal themes 
together in narratives about important values and life goals would be associated with 
markers of mental health and well-being. As predicted, moral centrality was associated 
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with markers of psychological health such as lower depression, anxiety, and negative 
affect, and higher well-being and self-esteem. Contrary to expectations, moral centrality 
was not associated with the presence of meaning in life, positive affect, or lower 
interpersonal problems. However, these null associations can help to clarify the nature of 
the relationship between moral centrality and psychological health. Interpretations of 
these null associations are discussed below.
A secondary aim of this study was to differentiate between the effects of altruism 
and moral centrality. Whereas altruistic behaviour may incur benefits through social 
rewards, moral centrality is posited to have intrinsic benefits that do not rely on such 
rewards. Thus, it was predicted that moral centrality would have a pattern of associations 
that altruism could not explain. As expected, the overall pattern of results supports the 
proposition that moral centrality and altruism each relate to mental health and well-being 
in different ways. In every instance of significant results in the present analyses, the 
variance explained by altruism and moral centrality did not overlap, and they tended to be
associated with different markers of mental health: Whereas moral centrality was 
uniquely associated with lower depression, anxiety, and negative affect, and with higher 
self-esteem, altruism uniquely predicted positive affect. In the single case where both 
moral centrality and altruism contributed to the prediction of an outcome variable (well-
being), both predictors uniquely contributed to the regression model. Taken together, 
these results provide a strong indication that moral centrality and altruism each have 
different relationships with mental health and well-being. 
The finding that positive affect was only associated with altruism also clarifies 
how the latter differs from moral centrality in terms of their relationships with mental 
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health and well-being. Altruistic behaviour consists of momentary acts of kindness 
(Rushton et al., 1981), each of which may produce joy at that moment in time. Similarly, 
people with a positive disposition may be more likely to engage in altruistic behaviour. A
person who has developed moral centrality, however, engages in behaviours that are 
consistent with their values, regardless of the feelings punctually associated with specific 
behaviours. For example, ethical conduct often involves difficult choices that may create 
short term feelings of being conflicted. Moral centrality may thus promote a more long-
term feeling of calm and being in balance instead of short-term elation. Indeed, the 
present results suggest that it is this tendency to act in accordance with deeply held values
that is most strongly associated with markers of mental health.
As mentioned above, moral centrality may work similarly to eudaimonic 
orientations by promoting a sustainable, long-term strategy towards well-being with 
benefits that accumulate gradually. Similar to the eudaimonic orientation, people with 
moral centrality make decisions based on their alignment with values rather than for their 
ability to produce positive affect. This is consistent with the research of Huta and Ryan 
(2010), who found that pleasure-seeking orientations towards well-being are more closely
associated with positive affect than are eudaimonic orientations. It also is consistent with 
the results of an intervention study published in the same paper. Activities designed to 
increase pleasure and comfort were related to well-being benefits in the short term, but 
not after a three-month follow-up, whereas activities designed to increase eudaimonia 
produced benefits after 3 months. 
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Exploratory Analysis
In addition to the primary analysis, exploratory analyses were conducted to test 
the contribution of specific individual values (i.e., power, achievement, benevolence, and 
universalism) to the results found here. Although previous research showed connections 
between agentic values and well-being (Garcia et al., 2015), these findings were not 
replicated in the present study. The exploratory analysis revealed that, with only one 
exception, the individual VEINs did not significantly predict the outcome variables. The 
one exception was that power was significantly related to altruism and well-being. 
However, the VEIN coding system was designed and validated specifically to measure 
moral centrality. That is, the degree to which people weave together themes of agency 
and communion in personal narratives. Thus, the full value profiles may differ from the 
profiles that might be generated by Schwartz’s (1992) measure of universal values, which
measures the relative importance of different values based on self-report. 
A second set of exploratory analyses tested all possible agency-communion VEIN
combinations as predictors of the main outcome variables. The purpose of these analyses 
was to discern overall patterns in the data in order to identify whether a specific agency-
communion combination accounted for the overall results. Although it is important to 
keep in mind the high likelihood of Type 1 error, the results clearly showed that the 
achievement-benevolence combination was the most predictive of the outcome variables. 
In addition to mirroring the predictions of moral centrality, achievement-benevolence 
also was significantly associated with the presence of meaning in life and with less 
interpersonal problems. In these two cases, it is possible that in the analyses involving 
overall moral centrality, the association between meaning in life and interpersonal 
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functioning on one hand, and moral centrality on the other, was obscured by the presence 
of other agency-communion combinations. However, although these associations could 
be meaningful, they are small and need replication because of the increased likelihood of 
Type 1 error associated with multiple exploratory analyses. Taken together, the results of 
this analyses indicate that the achievement-benevolence combination accounts for most 
of the associations observed between moral centrality and the outcome variables and may
be the most important combination of values to investigate in the context of mental 
health. 
The coordination of achievement and benevolence may be associated with 
markers of mental health and well-being because it orients a person towards goals that 
directly fulfill two basic psychological needs: competence and relatedness. Competence 
and relatedness constitute two of three basic psychological needs that, according to Deci 
and Ryan (2000), are essential for psychological well-being and personal growth. The 
goals of achievement and benevolence directly orient a person towards the satisfaction of 
competence and relatedness, respectively. Competence and personal success are the 
primary goals of achievement. Benevolence, which entails caring for the welfare of close 
others, directly contributes to the development of meaningful relationships. In contrast, 
power represents a desire for social dominance and universalism represents a concern for 
the welfare of all people. Although power and universalism may have instrumental value,
they do not directly orient a person towards the satisfaction of these basic, more 
proximal, psychological needs. 
Following this, the coordination of achievement and benevolence may be 
associated with these markers of psychological health because it contributes to 
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eudaimonia, or the realization of human potential. The coordination of these values 
indicates the pursuit of goals that develop one’s innate natural capacities and talents in a 
way that also contributes to the welfare of others. Because these values are normally at 
odds, their coordination represents a more optimal way of satisfying the needs for 
relatedness and competence. That is, it would enhance a person’s ability to realize their 
full potential in terms of both their personal growth and their ability to develop 
meaningful relationships. This could explain why achievement-benevolence predicted 
eudaimonic well-being in the present study, and in turn, why it predicted the other 
markers of psychological health. Eudaimonic well-being entails self-actualization, and 
the presence of meaning in life, and is associated with a variety of markers of 
psychological health such as less depression and anxiety, and higher self-esteem 
(Waterman et al., 2010). If the achievement-benevolence value combination contributes 
to eudaimonic well-being, as was found in the present study, it is not surprising that it 
also predicts the markers of mental health assessed here.
The association between achievement-benevolence and fewer interpersonal 
problems suggests that this value combination may also play a role in social functioning. 
The exploratory analysis revealed a small negative correlation across the subscales of the 
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems, indicating a small but consistent association 
between a higher expression of achievement-benevolence values and lower interpersonal 
dysfunction. Prioritizing achievement and benevolence may create a balance between 
attending to the self and attending to others that is not present with power and 
universalism, and which may mitigate extreme manifestations of dominant and affiliative 
behaviour. Whereas power represents a desire for dominance over others and 
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universalism represents a care for the environment and the welfare of all people, the end 
goals of achievement and benevolence are personal success and the welfare of those in 
one’s in-group, respectively. Thus, a person who values both achievement and 
benevolence may be better able to contribute to the welfare of others without being too 
self-sacrificing or overly accommodating. Similarly, they may be better able to pursue 
personal success without being excessively domineering or self-centered.
In summary, although overall moral centrality was associated with better general 
mental health, the combination of achievement and benevolence values seems to account 
for this association. This specific combination also showed a small, but consistent, 
association with the experience of living a more meaningful life and with reporting better 
interpersonal functioning. Although these latter results were issued from exploratory 
analyses and await replication, their consistency in the present data set suggest that they 
may represent a true phenomenon. 
Limitations
All of the recruited participants in this study were university students, and the 
majority of them were young adults. This limits the study because it is unknown whether 
the results can be generalized or if moral centrality presents unique associations in this 
population. Moreover, since moral centrality is a developed trait, it is possible that the 
participants are still in the process of developing it given their young age. Low ethnic 
diversity also is a limitation: The majority of the participants identified as European, 
which makes it possible that the effects observed in this study are specific to this group 
and could be more or less pronounced in other ethnic/cultural groups. 
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Additionally, all data were collected online and through written format. Although 
similar data collection methods have previously been used to measure moral centrality, it 
is possible that this form of questioning may have limited the accurate assessment of 
moral centrality. For instance, although all participants answered the same questions, 
variation in response style may have affected the results if some participants put more 
thought and effort into their writing and/or were more proficient in their written English. 
In the future, coded in-person interviews may help control these issues. 
Finally, because this study was correlational, causality and directionality of 
association cannot be determined. Although it was argued that the development of moral 
centrality may serve as a buffer against psychological distress because it represents a 
natural tendency to integrate normally opposed values, there are several alternative 
explanations for the associations found in this study. One possibility is that mental health 
and well-being make people more likely to develop moral centrality. For instance, the 
development of moral centrality may require a certain degree of emotional stability, and 
thus symptoms of psychological distress like depression and anxiety may interfere with 
the development of moral centrality. Alternatively, it is possible that a third variable is 
accounting for the patterns revealed in this study. For example, secure attachment 
between parent and child is associated with mental health later in life (Balbernie, 2013). 
Parents who promote healthy attachment styles with their children may also be modeling 
moral centrality by staying sensitive to their needs while simultaneously promoting their 
future mental health. Similarly, playing team sports has been shown to simultaneously 
promote self esteem and moral development in girls (Perry-Burney & Takyi, 2002). It is 
possible that participation in team sports may also promote moral centrality. Therefore, 
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additional research is necessary to better understand the direction of the associations 
found here.
Implications
Although this study is correlational, several provisional suggestions can be made. 
For therapists and alternative treatment providers who want to utilize interventions with a
moral component, the current study suggests that communal values may be more 
protective when combined with agentic values. It is thus recommended that treatment 
providers pay attention to whether or not the moral component of an intervention might 
hinder a person’s feeling of personal agency. Interventions with a moral component that 
do not also promote agency may be less effective. The present study shows that 
combining agentic and communal values may be associated with positive outcomes, and 
thus practitioners might benefit from attending to how different value combinations are 
satisfied through individual goals. 
Additionally, the results of this study suggest that the specific combination of 
achievement and benevolence may be especially protective. Thus, it may be beneficial to 
keep track of the degree to which a person’s goals contribute to the satisfaction of both of
these values. For instance, a common practice in cognitive behavioural therapy is to have 
clients keep track of the degree to which different activities give them a sense of mastery 
and enjoyment (Beck, 2011). This practice could be extended to include ratings of the 
degree to which particular activities contribute to a sense of relatedness with others. 
Therapists might also discuss how mastery activities might be modified so that they can 
better contribute to the satisfaction of communal values. 
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Future Directions
Research on moral centrality holds considerable promise as a means of further 
illuminating how aspects of morality may relate to mental health. In future research, the 
nature of the connection between moral centrality and mental health could be clarified. 
Ideally, longitudinal studies could be employed to establish whether psychological 
distress prevents the development of moral centrality, or whether moral centrality 
protects against psychological distress. If the latter, researchers might further investigate 
the long-term effects of moral centrality, and whether it is preventative of psychological 
distress across time and into advancing age. Additionally, researchers might also explore 
the degree to which moral centrality can be consciously developed or cultivated through 
the use of interventions. Interventions that increase moral centrality could then be 
employed to explore the underlying causality of the relationships found in this study. For 
instance, whether a moral centrality intervention can improve mental health. 
Additionally, moral centrality may also be explored as a potential mechanism underlying 
the benefits of alternative therapies with a moral component. For instance, researchers 
might explore whether or not Ashtanga Yoga or Alcoholics Anonymous can affect 
changes in moral centrality, and if these changes contribute to the success of these 
interventions. Such research will contribute to a better understanding of how the moral 
components of these interventions contribute to their success, and may also be used to 
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Title: Mental Health and Personal Narratives in University Students.




The following study consists of an online survey. The total duration of the online survey 
is not expected to exceed 1.5 hours of your time, and it is worth 1.5 bonus points if you 
are registered in one or more eligible psychology courses. 
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Appendix B
Consent to Participate in Research
Title of Study: “Self-Narratives and Mental Health in University Students”
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Joseph Hoyda and super-
vised by Dr. Josée Jarry, from the Department of Psychology at the University of Wind-
sor. Results of this study will be used to fulfil the requirements of a Master’s thesis.
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the
primary investigator, Joseph Hoyda, by email at  hoyda@uwindsor.ca or the faculty su-
pervisor,  Dr. Josée Jarry by email  at  jjarry@uwindsor.ca or by telephone at 519-253-
3000, ext. 2237.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to evaluate a novel method of analysing values through self-narratives,
and how they relate to mental health in undergraduate university students. 
PROCEDURES
By selecting “I agree to participate” and typing your name in the box below, you are indi-
cating that you consent to participate in this study. Once you have signed this consent
form by typing your name, you will complete a survey that consists of several question-
naires in randomized order. Please complete the survey when you are alone in a quiet
place where you can concentrate fully. The survey will take approximately 1.5 hours to
complete, and you are required to complete the questionnaires in one sitting.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
During the course of your participation in this study, you will be asked to answer 
questions that are personal and may cause discomfort. Some people may experience mild 
discomfort when answering questions about how they feel about themselves. However, 
no significant risks or discomforts are anticipated. You may choose not to answer any 
question if you feel uncomfortable answering, and you may withdraw from the study at 
any time. If you experience any discomfort you may contact the primary investigator or 
the faculty supervisor directly to address your concerns. If you have any concerns you 
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would like to discuss with an independent party, please feel free to contact the Student 
Counselling Centre at 519-252-3000 ext. 4616.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
Participating in this study provides you the opportunity to contribute to psychological re-
search and gain familiarity with online research procedures. Information provided by in-
dividuals participating in this study will help guide future research and will increase soci-
ety’s knowledge of self-narratives and mental health in undergraduate populations. 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
Participants will receive 1 bonus point for 1 hour of participation towards the
psychology participant pool, if registered in the pool and enrolled in one or more eligible
courses. 
CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified 
with you will remain confidential. Data will be de-identified for analysis after completion
of the survey and no data will be associated with an individual. Consent forms will be 
stored separate from the data, keeping the data anonymous. The data will be acquired and
stored online, using Qualtrix, which ensures complete confidentiality. Qualtrix does not 
record any information from the device accessing the website, except for the answers pro-
vided on the questionnaires. Once the questionnaires are completed, the data will be up-
loaded to an Excel spreadsheet and stored on the principal investigator’s computer and 
the lab computer. Only the principal investigator and the faculty supervisor will have 
password required to access the data file. Upon completion of the study, participant data 
will be kept for approximately nine years, and then all data will be destroyed. This is in 
compliance with psychology discipline guidelines of keeping data for seven years post 
publication.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this study is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time dur-
ing the study. You are not required to answer any questions that you do not feel comfort-
able answering.  Participation in this study will have no bearing on evaluation of your
class performance. If you choose to withdraw at any point, you may do so. All you have
to do is click “Withdraw” and your data will be discarded. Additionally, you may refuse
to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still remain in the study. The in-
vestigator may withdraw you from this research if appropriate circumstances arise. A
valid response profile is required to receive compensation; an invalid response profile
may be defined as a profile that is unlikely to occur by chance, such as all questions being
given the same answer. If an invalid response profile arises, you will receive an e-mail
inviting you to redo the study. If you decline or another invalid response profile is pro-
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duced, you may not receive the bonus point. If you choose to withdraw, all incomplete
data will be destroyed. If you would like to withdraw after completing the study, you may
do so by contacting the primary investigator (Joseph Hoyda) before April 1st, 2020 (hoy-
da@uwindsor.ca).
You may request your data be withdrawn from the study at any point up to two weeks af-
ter completion of the study by emailing Joseph Hoyda (hoyda@uwindsor.ca). Your deci-
sion to participate in this study is completely independent of your academic standing,
course grades, and relationship with the University. Your decision to withdraw from the
study will not result in any negative consequences; for example, a negative credit will not
be applied to your account in the pool. Withdrawal does not forfeit your bonus credit,
however, as outlined above, depending on the portion of the study completed up to the
time of withdrawal, fewer credits may be awarded. This is consistent with participant
pool policies. 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
A summary of results is expected to be available on the Research Ethics Board Website 
after August 2020.
Web address: www.uwindsor.ca/reb
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations. 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research
Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-
253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
I understand the information provided for the study “Self-Narratives and Mental Health
in University Students” as described herein. My questions have been answered to my sat-
isfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. 
Please select “I agree to participate” and enter your first name to indicate that you con-
sent to participate. If you DO NOT consent to participate, please select “I do NOT agree
to participate.” It is recommended that you print a copy of this form for your records. 
o I agree to participate
o I do NOT agree to participate
Please enter your name in the box below in place of a signature




Letter of Information for Debriefing and Consent to Data Retention
Is moral centrality associated with better mental health? Evidence for the protective
effects of integrating agency and communion
Thank you for participating in this study. This study was designed to investigate 
the relationship between moral development and mental health. The idea that morality 
and mental health or well-being is a fundamental idea in many world religions, and 
morality has been used in a wide variety of mental health interventions. However, the 
nature of this relationship has not been thoroughly investigated by researchers in 
psychology. One reason for this is that moral development is very difficult to measure. 
This study utilizes a novel measurement of moral development that makes it more
suitable for measuring the relationship between morality and mental health. The main 
construct it measures is called moral centrality. Normally, people's desires are in 
opposition to what they believe is the right thing to do, which results in conflicting 
motivations that may be detrimental to well-being. Occasionally, some people's desires 
are aligned with their moral beliefs. This alignment is called moral centrality, and the 
main purpose of this study it investigate whether this alignment is beneficial to well-
being and mental health. 
For this study, you completed an online survey in which you answered a series of 
open-ended questions about your personal values and strivings, followed by several self-
report questionnaires. The open-ended questions will be coded to measure moral 
centrality to determine if there is a relationship between moral centrality and mental 
health. The questionnaires will be used to form a comprehensive psychological 
assessment of mental health and well-being. Together, they measure depression, anxiety, 
interpersonal functioning, self-esteem, anxiety, the presence of meaning in life, and pro-
social functioning. 
I want you to know that I recognize that some of the questionnaires I asked you to 
complete were personal in nature. Some people might feel uncomfortable answering 
these questionnaires, others would not be uncomfortable at all. Both of these responses 
are perfectly normal. If you have any concerns, I encourage you to contact the primary 
investigator, Joseph Hoyda. You may also contact the Student Counselling Centre at 519-
253-3000, ext. 4616, if you wish to discuss your concerns with someone outside the 
study. If you have any concerns or questions at all about the study, or are interested in re-
ceiving more information, please feel free to contact the primary investigator, Joseph 
Hoyda, Department of Psychology, at hoyda@uwindsor.ca.
As in most psychological research, we are interested in how the average person re-
acts in this situation. We need to test many people and combine their results in order to 
get a good indication of how the average person reacts under the different conditions. In 
order for us to draw any conclusions, we have to combine the data we got from you with 
data we get from other people so that we have enough data to draw conclusions. What 
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this means is that there will be many people participating in this study. It is going to be 
necessary for us to ask you not to say anything about the study to anyone else. If you 
talked to someone else about the study and told them all the things I just told you and 
then they were in the study, their reactions wouldn’t be spontaneous and natural, and their
results couldn’t be used and combined with your data and those from other people. If that 
happened, we wouldn’t have enough data to make conclusions about the average person, 
so the whole study really would be for nothing. I hope you can see why it is extremely 
important that I ask you not to say anything about the study. You might think that it won’t
make a difference if you talk to your roommate about it because they’ll never be in the 
study, but your roommate might say something to someone else who might be in the 
study. Thus, I would like to ask you not to say anything about the study, other than you 
completed some questionnaires until the end of the study, when results are posted on the 
Research Ethics Board website. 
If you consent below, the data you have provided in both studies, including your 
questionnaire responses and your interview data, will be used. You are free to decide not 
to consent without having to give a reason and without penalty. If you do not consent, 
your data will be destroyed. You are encouraged to save or print a copy of this form. 
I have read and understand the information above and any questions I have asked have 
been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to allow my data from both studies to be used 
in this research, knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at 
any time within the next two weeks without consequence.
I have read and understand the information above and any questions I have asked have 
been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to allow my data to be used in this research, 
knowing that I can withdraw from further participation in the research at any time within 
the next two weeks without consequence. 
o I consent to the use of my data
o I do NOT consent and wish that my data be destroyed.
Please enter your name in the box below in place of a signature
Please enter today’s date. 
YYYY/MM/DD
If you have any complaints or reservations about any ethical aspect of your participation 
in this research, you may contact the Research Ethics Coordinator, University of 
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: 
ethics@uwindsor.ca. Any complaint you make will be treated in confidence and 
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Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-32
People have reported having the following problems in relating to other people. Please 
read the list below, and for each item, consider whether it has been a problem for you 
with respect to any significant person in your life. Then circle the number that describes 
how distressing that problem has been.
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
The following are things you find hard to do with other people.
It is hard for me to: 
 1. Say “no” to other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 2. Join in on groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 3. Keep things private from other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 4. Tell a person to stop bothering me. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 5. Introduce myself to new people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 6. Confront people with problems that come up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 7. Be assertive with another person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 8. Let other people know when I am angry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
 9. Socialize with other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
10. Show affection to people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
11. Get along with people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
12. Be firm when I need to be. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
13. Experience a feeling of love for another person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
14. Be supportive of another person’s goals in life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
15. Feel close to other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
16. Really care about other people’s problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
17. Put somebody else’s needs before my own. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
18. Feel good about another person’s happiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
19. Ask other people to get together socially with me. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
20. Be assertive without worrying abouEt hurting the other
 person’s feelings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
The following are things that you do too much.
21. I open up to people too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
22. I am too aggressive toward other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
23. I try to please other people too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
24. I want to be noticed too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
25. I try to control other people too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
26. I put other people’s needs before my own too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
27. I am overly generous to other people. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
28. I manipulate other people too much to get what I want. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
29. I tell personal things to other people too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
30. I argue with other people too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
31. I let other people take advantage of me too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
32. I am affected by another person’s misery too much. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
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Appendix F
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feeling and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indi-
cate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use the 
following scale to record your answers.
 1 2 3 4 5
Very slightly or
not at all
























Below is a list of statements about your general feelings about yourself. Please select the 
appropriate answer per item, depending on whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, 
or strongly disagree with it. 
0 1 2 3
Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree
 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most people. 
5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 




STATE: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the 
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
Not at all Somewhat Moderately
so
Very much so
1. I feel calm 1 2 3 4
2. I feel secure 1 2 3 4
3. I am tense 1 2 3 4
4. I feel strained 1 2 3 4
5. I feel at ease 1 2 3 4
6. I feel upset 1 2 3 4
7. I am presently worrying over 
possible misfortunes
1 2 3 4
8. I feel satisfied 1 2 3 4
9. I feel frightened 1 2 3 4
10. I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4
11. I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4
12. I feel nervous 1 2 3 4
13. I am jittery 1 2 3 4
14. I feel indecisive 1 2 3 4
15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 4
16. I feel content 1 2 3 4
17. I am worried 1 2 3 4
18. I feel confused 1 2 3 4
19. I feel steady 1 2 3 4
20. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
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TRAIT: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each statement 
and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel generally feel. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Don’t spend too much time on any statement but give the answer which seems to describe 





21. I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4
22. I feel nervous and restless 1 2 3 4
23. I am satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4
24. I wish I could be as happy 
as others seem to be
1 2 3 4
25. I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4
26. I feel rested 1 2 3 4
27. I am ‘calm, cool, and 
collected.’
1 2 3 4
28. I feel that difficulties are 
piling up so that I cannot 
overcome them
1 2 3 4
29. I worry too much over 
something that really doesn’t 
matter
1 2 3 4
30. I am happy 1 2 3 4
31. I have disturbing thoughts 1 2 3 4
32. I lack self-confidence 1 2 3 4
33. I feel secure 1 2 3 4
34. I make decisions easily 1 2 3 4
35. I feel inadequate 1 2 3 4
36. I am content 1 2 3 4
37. Some unimportant thought 
runs through my mind and 
bothers me
1 2 3 4
38. I take disappointments so 
keenly that I can’t put them out 
of my mind
1 2 3 4
39. I am a steady person 1 2 3 4
40. I get in a state of tension or 
turmoil as I think over my 
recent concerns and interests
1 2 3 4
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Appendix I
Meaning in Life Questionnaire
Please take a moment to think about what makes your life feel important to you. Please 
respond to the following statements as truthfully and accurately as you can, and also 
please remember that these are very subjective questions and that there are no right or 





















1. I understand my life’s meaning.
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.
3. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.
9. My life has no clear purpose.
10. I am searching for meaning in my life.
The copyright for this questionnaire is owned by the University of Minnesota. This questionnaire is intended for free use in research 




Beck Depression Inventory II
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of 
statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best 
describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. 
Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the 
group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that 
you do not choose more than one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in 
Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
 0 I do not feel sad.
 1 I feel sad much of the time.
 2 I am sad all the time.
 3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2. Pessimism
 0 I am not discouraged about my future.
 1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I 
used
 to be.
 2 I do not expect things to work out for me.
 3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get 
worse.
3. Past Failure
 0 I do not feel like a failure.
 1 I have failed more than I should have.
 2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
 3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure
 0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the 
 things I enjoy.
 1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
 2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used
 to enjoy.
 3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used to 
enjoy.
5. Guilty Feelings
 0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
 1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or
 should have done.
 2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
 3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
6. Punishment Feelings
 0 I don't feel I am being punished.
 1 I feel I may be punished.
 2 I expect to be punished.
 3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike
 0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
 1 I have lost confidence in myself.
 2 I am disappointed in myself.
 3 I dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
 0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than 
 usual.
 1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
 2 I criticize myself for all my faults.
 3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thought or Wishes
 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
 1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
 not carry them out.
 2 I would like to kill myself.
 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
 0 I don't cry anymore than I used to.
 1 I cry more than I used to.
 2 I cry over every little thing.
 3 I feel like crying, but I can't.
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11. Agitation
 0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
 1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
 2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay 
still.
 3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep
 moving or doing something.
12. Loss of Interest
 0 I have not lost interest in other people or 
activities.
 1 I am less interested in other people or things
 than before.
 2 I have lost most of my interest in other people
 or things.
 3 It's hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
 0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
 1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than 
usual.
 2 I have much greater difficulty in making 
 decisions than I used to.
 3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness 
 0 I do not feel I am worthless.
 1 I don't consider myself as worthwhile and 
 useful as I used to.
 2 I feel more worthless as compares to other 
people. 
 3 I feel utterly worthless.
15. Loss of Energy
 0 I have as much energy as ever.
 1 I have less energy than I used to have.
 2 I don't have enough energy to do very much.
 3 I don't have enough energy to do anything.
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
 0 I have not experienced any change in my 
sleeping pattern. 
 1a I sleep somewhat more than usual.
 1b I sleep somewhat less than usual.  
 2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
 2b I sleep a lot less than usual.  
 3a I sleep most of the day.
 3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to 
sleep.
17. Irritability
 0 I am no more irritable than usual.
 1 I am more irritable than usual.
 2 I am much more irritable than usual.
 3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
 0 I have not experienced any change in my 
 appetite. .  
 1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual.
 1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. .  
 2a My appetite is much less than before.
 2b My appetite is much greater than usual. .  
 3a I have no appetite at all.
 3b I crave food all the time.
19. Concentration Difficulty
 0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
 1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
 2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for very long.
 3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
 0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
 1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual.
 2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the 
 things I used to do.
 3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I 
used to do.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
 0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in 
sex.
 1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
 2 I am much less interested in sex now.




The Self-Report Altruism Scale
Never Once More than
once
Often Very Often
1. I have helped push a stranger's car out of the snow.
2. I have given directions to a stranger.
3. I have made change for a stranger.
4. I have given money to charity.
5. I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked
me for it).
6. I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.
7. I have done volunteer work for a charity.
8. I have donated blood. 
9. I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (books, 
parcels, etc.)
10. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a 
stranger. 
11. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup 
(at Xerox machine, in the supermarket)
12. I have given a stranger a lift in my car.
13. I have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the 
supermarket) in undercharging me for an item. 
14. I have let a neighbour whom I didn't know too well 
borrow and item of some value to me (e.g., a dish, tools, 
etc.). 
15. I have bought 'charity' Christmas cards deliberately 
because I knew it was a good cause. 
16. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well 
with a homework assignment when my knowledge was 
greater than his or hers. 
17. I have before being asked, voluntarily looked after a 
neighbour's pets or children without being paid for it.
18. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger 
across a street. 
19. I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger 
who was standing.
20. I have helped an aquaintance to move households.
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Appendix L
VEIN Coding and Scoring Examples
The following represents 3 examples of a thematic 'chunk' and how they would be coded 
into a data matrix. Agentic themes (power or achievement) are in bold, communal 
themes (benevolence or universalism) are in italic, and values that are neither agentic or 
communal are underlined.
Chunk 1: I am a really hard worker and I hope to one day become an influential 




Chunk 2: I am a hard worker and hope to become powerful lawyer so that I will always 
have financial security.
Achievement: hard worker 
Power: powerful, financial security
Chunk 3: The most important thing in life is to be spontaneous have a good time.
Hedonism: good time
Stimulation: spontaneous
The following table is an example of how the tallied VEIN scores will look. Summary 
scores for the individual VEINS represent the total percentage of chunks that include that 
particular VEIN. The summary of the overlap score represents the percentage of chunks 
containing either an agentic value or communal value. This reflects the number of chunks
that contain both communal and agentic VEINs, divided by the amount of chunks that 
contain either agentic or communal themes present. The result represents the probability 
that communal VEIN will be interwoven with an agentic VEIN. 
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Data Matrix from VEIN coding
Main effect
Question Stem PO AC HE ST SD UN BE TR CO SE Overlap
Describe yourself Politician 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Lawyer 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Good time 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 --
Summary Score 66% 66% 33% 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50%
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Appendix M
Modified Personal Strivings List
One way to describe someone's personality is to consider the purposes or goals that the 
person seems to be seeking in their everyday behaviour. We might call these objectives 
“strivings.” Here are some examples of strivings: 
 Trying to be physically attractive to others
 Trying to help others in need of help
 Trying to seek new and exciting experiences
 Trying to reach your full potential
 Trying to be healthy-minded
These strivings can be broad (e.g., trying to make others happy) or specific (e.g., “trying 
to make my partner happy”). They can also include things that you try to avoid (e.g., 
“trying to avoid calling attention to yourself”). 
Please write down at least 15 strivings in the space below. Be as honest an objective as 
possible. Do not give simply socially desirable strivings, or strivings which you think you
“ought” to have. 
You might find it useful to think about your goals in different domains in life: work, 
school, home, family, social relationships, leisure, hobbies. Think about all of your 
desires, goals, wants, and hopes in these different areas. 
Please take your time with this task, and take a few minutes thinking about your goals 
before you begin. Each response will be followed by a prompt which will ask you why 
this striving is important to you. 
I typically try to_________________________________________________________
Why is this important to you? ______________________________________________
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Appendix N
Personal Values and Goals
This questionnaire consists of 8 open-ended questions about your goals and values in life.
Before each question, take this opportunity to reflect on who you are and what makes you
different from other people. 
Please answer each question in as much detail as possible. After each question, you will 
be asked to write a sentence or two explaining why this is important to you. 
1. Write about two activities that are most important to you. For each activity, provide a 
description of why these activities are important to you.
2. Write about two things that you would like to accomplish in life. For each goal, 
provide a description of why you would like to accomplish this.
3. What would be your ideal job/career? Why? What makes that career attractive to you?
4. Describe something you have done in your life that you are particularly proud of. 
Why?
5. What are some habits that you try to maintain? Why?
6. Write about three characteristics that defines you or is important to who you are. Why 
is that important to you?
7. What do you like most about yourself? Why?
8. What character traits do you most admire? Why?
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